The
housing bubble, its collapse, subprime mortgage crisis. Since about
1998, subprime mortgage loans have accounted for about 1/4 of US home
sales. Such mortgages allowed people with low or bad credit ratings to
purchase homes. Easy credit resulted in a housing boom/bubble between
2000 and 2005 and was touted as a major plank of Bush’s “ownership
society”. The problem was people were sold too much house financed by
loans that they could initially, if marginally, afford but which they
could not after a few years as the terms on their loans changed and
monthly payments greatly increased. The effects of this nonsensical
lending and speculation were delayed for awhile as the housing market
was on the way up and the value of homes (including those financed by
subprime loans) steadily increased, but in late 2006 the bubble became
unsustainable and burst. Ameriquest
the largest subprime lender went belly up after a $325 million
settlement with 30 state Attorney Generals for deceptive lending and
marketing practices. (Its former CEO Robert Arnell was appointed
Ambassador to the Netherlands by George Bush.) It was not alone. Other
subprime lenders like Mortgage Lenders Network USA and Ownit
followed suit. Market analysts try to downplay the significance of the
subprime disaster but its effects continue to ripple through financial
markets. For one thing most of the mortgage loans were not held by the
original lenders but sold to investors and hedge funds. As a result two
Bear Stearns funds failed and on August 9, 2007 the French bank BNP Paribas
froze withdrawals from 3 of its funds due to subprime losses sparking a
major sell off in stock markets and a liquidity crisis. In the
following 3 business days, the Fed injected
$64 billion into markets and the European Central Bank ~$213 billion in
an effort to stabilize them. The fallout from this housing bubble
collapse will be with us for years and is going to be very, very
expensive.
On December 6, 2007,
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson presented the Administration’s much
awaited plan to help homeowners with subprime mortgages. The program
called for a voluntary 5 year freeze on rates due to reset
between January 1, 2008 and July 31, 2010. It was available only to
those who were not delinquent in their payments and delays but does not
do away with interest rate resets at the end of this period. Finally,
it would affect at most 20% of such loans and probably far fewer (~12%).
All in all, the Paulson plan does little to help homeowners but then it
was never meant to. The real reason for the plan was to support housing
prices which could fall 20% to 30% due to the subprime bubble and so thereby minimize losses to investors.
On December 11, 2007,
the Fed cut short term interest rates down to 4.25%. This is the rate
that banks charge each other for overnight loans. It was the third rate
cut since September 2007 bringing the total decrease to a full
percentage point. While this could fuel inflation, it is unclear that
it will have any effect on the underlying fundamentals of the liquidity
crisis brought on by the subprime bubble.
On December 18, 2007,
European central banks created a $500 billion fund to provide two week
loans to commercial banks at 4.21% interest. The problem with most
banks is not that they lack money on hand but that they are leery of
lending it.
On February 13, 2008, Bush signed HR 5140 a $160 billion stimulus in the form of a tax rebate.
On March 16, 2008, JPMorgan agreed to buy Bear Stearns which had been heavily involved in the subprime crisis and suffered accordingly for $236 million
or about $2 a share. Bear Stearns stock had traded as high as $172 in
January 2006. The Fed assumed up to $30 billion in risk for the
company’s shakier investments. Basically, JPMorgan got Bear Stearns’
assets and the Fed guaranteed its debts. The thing that really scared
the financial community and led them to avert the company’s collapse
was that it was into the derivatives market to the tune of $13.4 trillion.
If it had fallen, it might have taken the whole international financial
market with it. Even so Bear Stearns’ exposure to the derivatives
market is not unusual for large investment banks. Still investors
resisted, and on March 24, 2008, JPMorgan raised its offer to $10 a
share.
On July 11, 2008,
IndyMac, the largest savings and loan in Los Angeles, collapsed. It had
experienced a run on its money after letters by Senator Charles Schumer
(D-NY) expressing concerns about the bank’s viability were released on
June 26, 2008. It is the largest bank failure related to the subprime
fiasco. The episode is another demonstration of how the impacts from
this debacle are still being felt and underlines the pervasive fear,
protestations to the contrary aside, that the worst is not over.
The giants in the room are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, publicly
owned government sponsored enterprises, who own or back some $5
trillion of the nation’s $12 trillion mortgage market. As of July 2008,
they have lost nearly 80% of their stock value since the subprime
meltdown in August 2007. They are quite literally too big to let fail
although the Bush Administration is doing the minimum to shore them up.
However the companies continued having problems raising money for their
mortgage lending operations.
On September 5, 2008,
the government informed the heads of Freddie and Fannie that the
companies were going to be put into conservatorship. This would allow
the government to restructure the companies while keeping them private.
Government plans put together by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
included replacing the current heads and boards of the companies,
wiping out the holdings of small investors and backing those of large
institutional ones: banks, foreign governments, mutual and pension
funds. These guarantees will likely cost taxpayers hundreds of billions
of dollars. It is a classic example of “privatizing gains and
socializing losses.” As is so typical with the economic approach of
this Administration, those who knew the most and can best sustain the
losses will be secured while those who can afford it least and had the
least involvement in creating this mess will be left to pay the bills
for it.
On September 7, 2008, the government announced details of its takeover. Herbert Allison
the former chair of teachers retirement fund TIAA-CREF was named to
head Fannie. He was the national finance chairman for McCain’s
Presidential campaign in 2000. David Moffett a senior adviser to the
Carlyle Group was picked to run Freddie. A Carlyle hedge fund with
large investments in Fannie and Freddie failed in March 2008.
It is troubling that both come from groups that have the most to gain
from a government bailout of the mortgage lending/holding companies.
More disturbing still is that both have such glaring conflicts of
interest.
Under the Paulson plan, each company would pay an at least 10%
dividend on $1 billion of government preferred stock. But in return for
this $200 million a year it would receive, the government has
guaranteed to back their losses up to $200 billion ($100 billion each).
Also at some time in the future if the companies ever became profitable
the government could buy up 80% of them for $1 a share. The contrary
case is more likely where the government would need to buy them because
they continue to be unprofitable. A largely ignored part of the Paulson
plan would be to reduce Fannie and Freddie participation in and share
of the mortgage market beginning in 2010. This would have the effect of
making mortgages less available and more expensive. But, at the risk of
repeating myself, the whole government response to the housing bubble
is and has always been about protecting large speculators in the name
of market stability and at the expense of everyone else.
On September 14, 2008,
the financial services company Merrill Lynch sold itself to Bank of
America for $50 billion in what will likely turn out to be a bad deal
for BoA. On September 15, 2008, the investment bank of Lehman Brothers,
a prime player in the subprime market along with Bear Stearn, with its
stock now virtually worthless, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Currently teetering are the bank Washington Mutual and the insurance
giant AIG which was heavily into credit default swaps (these were
essentially insurance policies for subprime loans and amounted to free
money for AIG on the upside of the housing bubble but translated into
enormous debt exposure when the bubble burst and AIG had to start
paying up on them).
On September 16, 2008,
the federal government bought a 79.9% stake in AIG in exchange for a
two year $85 billion line of credit through the Fed at about an 11%
interest rate. AIG has $1.1 trillion in assets and a customer base of
74 million. Its stock had traded as high as $70.13 in the last year but
had since lost around 95% of its value. Amazingly, in just 10 days, the
US government has become the world’s largest landlord and insurance
provider.
Also amazing was that the only Wall Street executive at the meeting to decide AIG’s fate was Lloyd Blankfein
Paulson’s successor as CEO of Goldman Sachs. Goldman was AIG’s largest
trading partner and stood to lose $20 billion if AIG went under. So no
conflicts of interest there, nope, no.
On September 19, 2008
, as the government’s intervention in financial markets continued, the
Treasury Department said it would take the entire $50 billion worth of
the Depression-era Exchange Stabilization Fund and use it to guarantee
the $2 trillion money market financial sector. Money markets are big
holder of short term and usually quite safe loans. Problems began,
however, on September 16, 2008, when two of the largest Reserve Primary Fund and BNY Mellon Institutional Cash Reserves
broke the buck, i.e. when the return on a dollar invested in them fell
below one dollar, in response to losses from the Lehman bankruptcy.
This began a run on the funds generally. $224 billion was pulled from them in the week ending September 19 with $89.2 billion on September 17 alone. There was also a report
that Paulson intervened directly with institutional investors on
September 18 to prevent another $500 billion from being withdrawn.
Also on September 19, 2008, the SEC announced a ban on short selling
to last until October 2. This principally was to relieve pressure on
the investment bank Morgan Stanley whose share price had fallen 40% in
a week and caused a sharp rise on Wall Street as speculators were
forced to cover their shorts. Most ominously Paulson and Bernanke
stated their intentions of bailing out financial companies by buying
their toxic mortgage backed securities. This is a horrendously bad
decision for four reasons. First, it rewards those whose greed and
stupidity are most responsible for this disaster. Second, it doesn’t
help homeowners who have been completely forgotten in the rush to
“stabilize” financial markets. Third, it leaves taxpayers holding the
bag for what will end up costing them trillions. Fourth, it does
nothing to change and re-regulate the financial system so this won’t
happen again.
On September 20, 2008,
the Bush Administration announced its plan to bailout financial
institutions holding toxic mortgage backed securities. It would invest
Henry Paulson with vast new powers. As CEO and Chairman of the
investment bank Goldman Sachs, Paulson championed the deregulation and
bad practices that led to the current financial meltdown. For the last
two years, as Treasury Secretary, he did nothing to stave off the
bursting of the housing bubble and until the last two weeks nothing to
address its aftermath. The Administration’s proposal would give him
$700 billion and absolute unrestricted discretion to buy toxic mortgage
backed securities from whom he wants, at what price he wants, and do
what he wants with them, without review by anyone, outside of a pro
forma report to Congress.
Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of
this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may
not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.
This is an impossibly bad idea for the 4 reasons I gave in the last
paragraph but in addition puts one of the worst actors in charge of the
“cleanup”.
On September 21, 2008,
foreign banks decided they too wanted a piece of this $700 billion
bonanza and Paulson obligingly modified his plan to include foreign
financial institutions which had “significant operations” in the US
whatever that means, and it could mean almost anything. The Fed also
accepted the application
of the last two investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to
join the Fed. They would convert themselves into bank holding
companies, have to reduce their degree of leveraging to 10 to 1, and
accept greater oversight but in exchange they would gain access to the
Fed’s short term loan facilities. It was the drying up of credit that
posed the greatest threat of failure to them. And in their new forms it
is entirely conceivable that Paulson would ask them to help manage the
bailout to the meltdown they did so much to create.
What is simply stupefying is that Paulson wants effective control of
$700 billion based on a vague 2 page plan that White House spokesman
Tony Fratto said the Administration needed months to work out. This
raised the question of why Congress and the public were not brought in
earlier and their input sought instead of presenting it as a fait
accompli with only two weeks for the public to react and the Congress
to act before its pre-election adjournment. The vagueness of the plan
can not be overstated, unsurprising in such a short document. Indeed
the only solid part of it is its $700 billion cost, and it turns out
that was made up.
“It’s not based on any particular data point,” a Treasury spokeswoman told Forbes.com Tuesday. “We just wanted to choose a really large number.”
In this Administration, this is what passes for a serious plan and a
considered approach to deal with a potential financial collapse. Such
dimwittery got us into this mess. More will not get us out of it.
On September 24, 2008,
the Fed announced it would extend the currency swaps (to supply dollars
to foreign central banks) it introduced on September 18 for overnight
loans to $10 billion each for the Reserve Bank of Australia and the
Sveriges Riksbank and $5 billion each by the Danmarks Nationalbank and
the Norges Bank. This brings the money committed to these to $277
billion.
On September 25, 2008,
Washington Mutual, the nation’s largest savings and loan, with assets
of $307 billion was seized by government regulators and, without
informing either its board or CEO, sold to JP Morgan Chase for $1.9 billion.
If WaMu had failed, it might have cost taxpayers $20-$30 billion. What
is disturbing though is that JP Morgan picks up a very large bank for
almost nothing and will be able to dump WaMu’s bad loans on to
taxpayers as part of the Paulson bailout. In other words, JP Morgan
makes out like a bandit. It keeps the good stuff and sells the crap to
the rubes taxpayers. This is the problem of bailing out Wall Street instead of reforming it.
Much was made of the fact that Paulson and Bernanke were not going
to bailout Lehman Brothers, but that is not the whole story. On September 25, 2008,
a commenter to a Yahoo message board noted that Citibank was Lehman’s
largest unsecured creditor with claims of $138 billion. On September
15, 2008, the day Lehman filed for bankruptcy, JP Morgan transferred
$87 billion to it, and $51 billion the next day for a total transfer of
$138 billion. The Federal Reserve of New York made exactly similar
transfers to JP Morgan on the same dates. So while Lehman was allowed
to fail, the Fed used JP Morgan and Lehman to effect a secret bailout
of Citibank. What the Fed got in return for its money is currently
unknown. JP Morgan appears to have gotten WaMu. What is clear is that
the Fed did a run around the bankruptcy laws in a way which could well
be illegal and constitute fraud.
On September 26, 2008,
the Fed added another $10 billion to its currency swap with the
European Central Bank and $3 billion to the Swiss National Bank.
Instead of overnight loans, these two banks and the Bank of England
will make them for a week to ease end of the quarter cashflow problems.
This brings the value of these swaps to $290 billion.
On September 23, 2008, Paulson and Bernanke pitched their plan to
give them what they want or else to the Senate Financial Services
Committee chaired by Chris Dodd (D-CT) and the next day before the
House committee chaired by Barney Frank (D-MA). In the second hearing,
Paulson modified his position slightly saying he was for some oversight
and would accept caps on CEO remuneration. Both Dodd and Frank offered
plans which were modifications of Paulson’s. On September 25, 2008,
Bush was supposed to meet with Congressional leaders of both parties as
well as the two Presidential candidates to finish the deal. The object
was to give both sides cover for a plan that was strongly disliked by
most of the public. John McCain in something of a political stunt
“suspended” his campaign and canceled his appearance at the first
Presidential debate scheduled for September 26 to hurry back to
Washington to take charge. His efforts were appreciated by almost no
one. He signed on to a flaky last minute plan put forward by House
Republicans which would have involved more deregulation and cutting the
capital gains tax. The deal blew up, and McCain decided that sufficient
progress (and damage both to a deal and his campaign) had been made
that he would, in fact, show up for the debate and restart his campaign
which he had never really suspended. It is important to point out that
none of these plans address the fundamental problems of refinancing
mortgages and defusing derivatives, and so none of them will succeed.
They may delay things by a few months at a tremendous price but we are
still looking down the barrel of a very large and very ugly economic
gun.
On Sunday September 28, 2008, Bush, the Presidential candidates, and
Congressional leaders of both parties endorsed a “compromise” bailout
plan (HR 3997).
The bill was 110 pages long, so much longer than the original 2 page
Paulson plan. But it was still the Paulson plan, just a lot of lipstick
had been added. Paulson would still be able to buy, hold, and sell what
he wanted (not just mortgage backed securities but any securities he
wished) from whom he wanted (both American financial companies and any
foreign one with “significant” US interests not owned by a foreign
government). He would be the one to set up the market mechanisms
(reverse auctions) to buy the finance industry’s crap assets. He would
be the one to hire employees and contract companies to manage the
auctions and assets, and he would be the one to write the conflict of
interest rules which would govern these and ensure he could hire anyone
he wanted. One of the few additions is an insurance program for bad
assets which was unlikely to be widely used but was included to mollify
rebellious House Republicans.
Of central importance was the retention of the $700 billion figure.
The bill engaged in some kabuki on this to make it seem that there were
conditions on the money but there really weren’t. Paulson would
initially get $250 billion. When this was exhausted, he could make a
determination to Congress and with the President’s OK alone get another
$100 billion. The other $350 billion was also effectively at his
disposal since it required a joint resolution of both Houses to
disapprove it and in the face of a likely Presidential veto the
Congressional resolution would require a veto override (a 2/3 vote in
both Houses) to prevent its disbursement.
Most notably absent from the bill was any attempt to re-regulate
markets now or to extend direct aid to distressed homeowners (except
for continuing an income tax exclusion). On the other hand, it
contained a veritable blizzard of oversight panels and calls for
reports. A Financial Stability Oversight Board, the Comptroller General
(GAO), SEC, Fed, OMB, CBO, a program Inspector General, various House
and Senate committees, and an online list of the bailout’s business
were all supposed to be part of the oversight process. Yet none of
these had any enforcement authority. That power remained with Paulson.
Among the reports (in addition to all the audits), one was supposed to
give recommendations for market regulation to be completed by April 30,
2009, 7 months away and in another Administration. Another also on
regulation by the Congressional Oversight Panel was due January 20,
2009, i.e. on Inauguration Day. A third was to examine the role of mark
to market accounting (pricing assets according to their current sale
value) in bank failures and a fourth was to cover the effects of
leveraging and de-leveraging.
There were also interesting bits hidden away in the nooks and crannies of the bill. One particularly artful example
involved a simple change of date to a prior bill but what it did in
effect was to allow the Fed to pay interest on reserves held by banks
and permit banks to carry zero reserves. Another suspended mark to
market accounting allowing financial institutions to artificially
inflate the value of their assets to improve their balance sheets.
Interestingly Paulson held no press conference on the bill’s contents for the public but he did make a private telephone conference call
to 800 bankers and financial officers to discuss it. This call was
subsequently leaked to the internet. His take home message was I’ll get
the $700 billion, and I will take care of you guys. Paulson said that
if Treasury was forced to make direct purchases from companies of their
assets, then he would follow the same aggressive method he had used
with Fannie, Freddie, and AIG where CEOs lost their jobs. However, if
companies opted to participate voluntarily in the bailout program, he
was willing to be generous. He would not buy their assets at fire sale
prices but at what he called a “reasonable” value. Restrictions on
golden parachutes applied prospectively, and only in cases of
bankruptcy or firing. He would not seek stock warrants (essentially
options to sell stock at some future time) on the first $100 million of
assets purchased, and the warrants would be for non-voting stock.
Finally, he sought to re-assure them over a provision of the bill that
called for the government to recoup any losses to its $700 billion fund
after 5 years from the financial industry generally. He said that this
was essentially boilerplate that showed up in many Congressional bills,
that 5 years was a long time away, and that new legislation would be
required at that time for it. In other words, he thought it would be
defeated and wouldn’t happen.
On September 29, 2008, in a 15 minute vote that was held open for 38
minutes, conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats defeated the
bill 205-228
in the House. 140 Democrats voted for the Bush-backed “compromise”. 133
Republicans opposed it and their President. It is probably too much to
hope for but it would be nice if at this point lawmakers discarded the
Paulson plan and considered alternatives. The Swedish or Scandinavian
response to their banking crisis in the early 1990s might be useful.
Banks were forced to acknowledge their losses, and only when the extent
of their losses was known were they recapitalized under stricter
regulation. Such an approach encourages private participation because
assets are set at their true market value.
In addition to this, however, there must be help for homeowners and
restriction of the funny money instruments and accounting principles
the financial industry used to produce this mess. For this, we don’t
need further studies, all conveniently due in the next Administration.
What we need is to recognize and clear out the debt in the present
system, and this along with reform will create confidence in a new more
regulated, transparent one.
In other events on September 29, 2008, the Fed increased
its currency swaps pool with foreign central banks from $290 billion to
$620 billion in a further move to inject liquidity into markets. The
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell 777.68 points or nearly 7%. Another big bank bit the dust. Wachovia
was bought out by Citigroup for $2.2 billion. Citigroup agreed to
assume the first $42 billion of Wachovia’s mortgage related losses and
to pay the FDIC $12 billion in preferred stock and warrants to assume
the rest. The Citigroup buyout of Wachovia (which was for its banking
operations) ran into problems when on October 2, 2008,
Wells Fargo made a counter offer of $15 billion in stock for the whole
company and planned on using Wachovia’s losses as tax write offs.
Whichever way this goes, it represents a further and major
concentration of banking in the United States and likely loss of
competition.
Overseas the credit crunch was also taking its toll. On September 29, 2008, the UK seized Bradford & Bingley.
The government kept control of its £50 billion mortgage portfolio and
spun off its banking operations to Spain’s Santander. Meanwhile the
Benelux countries forked out $16.2 billion to bailout and partially
nationalize the bank giant Fortis which had problems with financing an
earlier merger. On September 30, 2008,
the governments of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg bailed out the bank
Dexia, a lender to mainly local governments, with a cash injection of
$9 billion. What this should tell you is that the shocks from the shaky
American financial markets are being felt throughout the world economy.
On October 1, 2008, the Senate in a 74-25 passed its version of the bailout. Its bill
ran 451 pages long. It contained the original “compromise” bill with
few changes, such as an increase in the limit from $100,000 to $250,000
for FDIC insured accounts. The greater length was principally due to
the attachment of an energy bill and a smorgasbord of tax provisions,
including ones dealing with wooden arrows (Sec. 503, pp. 295-296) and
wool products (Sec. 325, pp. 300-301). Only one Senator Bernie Sanders
(I-VT) who gave a ringing speech condemning the bill was allowed to
offer an amendment, one to raise tax rates for 5 years by 10% on those
making over $500,000 a year ($1 million for couples) to help pay for
the bailout. On a voice vote only Sanders’ voice was heard in favor of
it.
An October 2, 2008
New York Times story related how after 55 minutes of discussion on
April 28, 2004 the SEC, lobbied by the big 5 investment banks, removed
limits on their ability to leverage. In exchange the companies agreed
to open their books to the SEC but the SEC, especially under the
leadership of its head Christopher Cox, made no real effort to keep
tabs on what these companies were doing. Only seven people were
assigned to an office to monitor them and their (before the fall)
assets of $4 trillion, and the office has lacked a director since March
2007. The result was a casino mentality with no limits and no oversight.
There have been perhaps 4 major decisions that allowed the current
meltdown to happen. This 2004 SEC decision was one of them. The other 3
are:
- the 2003 ban by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency on the
pursuit of mortgage writers for predatory lending by state attorney
generals.
- the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act which included not
only the “Enron loophole” but deregulation of derivatives markets.
- the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act which repealed the Depression-era
Glass-Steagall Act which placed a wall between regular banks and
insurance companies on one side and investment banks on the other.
On October 3, 2008, the House voted on the Senate package which with the tax provisions now came in at over $800 billion and passed it 263-171
with a majority 172-63 of Democrats voting for and a majority of
Republicans 91-108 voting against. There is no evidence that the
liquidity the bill injects into the financial system will be used to
free up credit. This is known as a liquidity trap. There have been
several injections of liquidity into the system over the last year and
the credit crunch has only worsened. The reason is that banks and
financial institutions don’t know who is solvent and who is not. While
the bill allows them to dump toxic assets on the government, $700
billion is unlikely to cover all their losses. It is only a down
payment on them. So the problem remains the same. The banks and
financial institutions don’t know who’s solvent. They are likely to
hold the cash or restrict severely to whom they lend. Since the bill
doesn’t help distressed homeowners beyond a little lip service to their
plight, foreclosures, a housing glut, and downward pressure on housing
prices will continue and feed back negatively into the financial
system. The lack of re-regulation will not help re-instill confidence
in the system either. What makes this all especially tragic is that
there were at least 3 viable alternatives to the current crisis: 1)
direct government buying up of problem mortgages; 2) direct government
investment in banks; 3) direct government valuation of mortgage backed
paper. These singly or in combination together with re-regulation would
have provided a cheaper and more effective answer to the meltdown and
subsequent credit freeze.
On October 6, 2008, the Fed
announced that, per the passed Paulson plan, it would begin paying
interest on required bank reserves. It also increased immediately to
$300 billion the amount it would make available to banks in 1 and 3
month loans using crap paper as collateral. This is just the start. The
loan program called the Term Auction Facility (TAF) could have after
further auctions, according to the Fed, $900 billion in outstanding
loans by the end of 2008, collateralized by, to repeat myself, crap.
World stock markets greeted passage of the bailout (and lack of
concerted action in Europe) by falling precipitously. The Dow fell
nearly 800 points during the course of the day (9525.32-10322.76) and
closed, after a late rally, down 369.88 at 9,955.50, the first below
10,000 closing in 4 years.
Also on October 6, 2008, Henry Paulson named 35 year old Neel Kashkari
as interim head to run the bailout. Kashkari was a senior adviser to
Paulson at Goldman Sachs and followed him to Treasury in June 2008.
Goldman Sachs will likely play an integral part in managing the bailout
and profiting from it. In other words, what we are seeing is that those
who caused the meltdown are being entrusted to deal with it. It is
difficult to see how this could become more incestuous or how the
conflicts of interest could be any deeper.
On October 7, 2008, the Fed,
in response to the drying up of short term credit from money markets
after some broke the buck after the Lehman failure, announced a new
program the Commercial Paper Funding Facility which would make 3 month
unsecured loans to eligible banks, companies, and local governments (to
meet payrolls or pay suppliers, for example). The size of this market
is large between $1.6-1.8 trillion and no dollar estimate was put on
the Fed’s intervention. The Dow continued to react negatively to the
government’s expensive but ineffective moves to shore up the financial
system and fell 508.39 points to close at 9,447.11.
On October 8, 2008,
while the small country of Iceland teetered on the edge of bankruptcy,
the British partially nationalized 8 of its largest banks. In exchange
for preferred stock, the British government agreed to provide capital
and loan guarantees. This strategy invests their government in the
total worth of the company, not just its bad asssets as with the
Paulson plan, and gives it leverage to require that banks to free up
their credit for normal business and consumer lending, again in
contrast to the Paulson plan.
The Fed
and several central banks minus Japan cut their lending rates half a
percentage point. For the Fed, this meant a reduction in federal funds
and discount rates to 1.5%. This will make money cheaper to borrow if
you are a bank but it is unclear if it will make banks any more willing
to lend to anyone else, like businesses and consumers. The Fed also
announced that AIG which had already blown through $61 billion of the
$85 billion advanced to it would receive another $37.8 billion
injection of cash. In what is symptomatic of the lack of transparency
in the financial system the Fed described its action in terms which were, in fact, opposite from what it was doing.
Under this program, the New York Fed will borrow up to
$37.8 billion in investment-grade, fixed-income securities from AIG in
return for cash collateral.
On October 8, 2008, the Dow dropped 189.01 points
(2%). On October 9, 2008, the Dow dropped a further 678.91 points
(7.33%) to close below 9,000 at 8,579.19. This is the lowest close
since May 21, 2003. Exactly 1 year ago, the Dow closed at its all time
high of 14,164.53. In that year, the Dow has declined 5585.34 points or
39.4%. Of particular note is that it has fallen 2251.88 points (20.8%)
since October 1, 2008 when the Paulson plan was passed by the Senate
and signed into law. This is a clear vote of no-confidence in both
Paulson and Bernanke and their efforts to date. As a result, money is
hemorrhaging out of stocks seeking safer havens, such as currency.
Also on October 9, 2008,
Citigroup gave up on its bid to take over Wachovia. Interestingly, with
all of its problems, Wachovia was able to loan $8 million to the
National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC). Although Wachovia
is to be repaid at some point, what this amounts to is a very large
campaign contribution
to Republicans and goes to show that no matter how tottering the
financial system is it is never too shaky for a little corruption.
An October 11, 2008
story in Bloomberg reported that Treasury Secretary Paulson had
directed Fannie and Freddie in late September (in advance of the
passage of the $700 billion bailout) to add to their portfolios of bad
mortgage securities to the tune of $20 billion a month each from a $200
billion emergency fund that had been set up to help them deal with the
problems that had sent them into conservatorship. This is yet another
example of the double-dealing and lack of transparency which has come
to characterize Paulson’s approach to the crisis. While he was telling
Congress one thing, he was doing something else behind their backs. He
used money meant to shore up Fannie and Freddie to increase their
liabilities, and he did so in the pursuit of a strategy which the
events of the last week have already discredited. To date, Paulson’s
instincts on how to deal with the meltdown have been too little too
late, and just plain wrong.
On October 12, 2008,
the Fed okayed the takeover of Wachovia by Wells Fargo and Treasury
said it would protect a proposed $9 billion Mitsubishi purchase of 21%
of Morgan Stanley. On October 11-12, G7 finance ministers and central
bank governors met and came up with no coordinated plan.
On October 13, 2008,
the Mitsubishi-Morgan Stanley deal was finalized on terms so favorable
to Mitsubishi that it was pretty much impossible for them to lose any
money, and giving the Japanese company a reasonable chance of making a
killing on it. This says a lot about the sorry shape the former
investment bank giant is in. On this day, the Fed
made another capital injection in financial markets when it took off
all limits on currency swaps (which it had rapidly increased to $620
billion as recently as September 26, 2008) involving the Bank of
England, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank.
European countries announced a series of initiatives to shore up
their banking systems. In addition to the British move to partially
nationalize 3 of its banks, the Germans announced $500 billion in
guarantees for inter-bank loans and a further $108 billion to invest in
banks. The French came up with $435 billion in guarantees and $52
billion to invest. The Spanish had a $130 billion plan and the Italians
a $27 billion one. Meanwhile in the US, Paulson and his Mini-me
Kashkari continued to dither. They announced they would be setting up a
program to buy into banks. It would be voluntary, on what were
described as attractive terms for banks, and would be as per the $700
billion bailout plan be for non-voting stock. Paulson’s policy of
missing the point and doing too little too late continues.
In reaction to the European, as opposed to the American, actions,
the Dow had a good day. It rose 936.42 points (11.08%) to 9,387.61. It
is important to note that as currently structured this is a stopgap and
has yet to address the fundamental problems: bank solvency,
deregulation, credit default swaps, falling housing prices, and
forgotten homeowners.
Later in the day, Treasury
got around to announcing some of the details of its new plan. It would
commit up to $250 billion of the $700 billion bailout package to buy
stock in banks. At the same time the FDIC announced it would guarantee
inter-bank loans for 3 years but would charge a premium to do so.
On October 14, 2008, Treasury
announced further details of its new bank program. It would invest $125
billion in large banks and financial houses and make $125 billion
available for smaller banks. Citigroup, Bank of America, JP Morgan, and
Wells Fargo would each receive $25 billion. Paulson’s old firm Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, both recently converted to bank holding
companies (although I do not think that either currently owns a bank),
would get $10 billion each. Bank of New York Mellon got $3 billion and
State Street $2 billion. In exchange the government would get preferred
non-voting stock paying a 5% dividend per year for the first 5 years
and then 9% thereafter. Banks could, however, buy back this stock after
3 years.
The government would also get warrants to buy common stock equal to 15%
of the money invested. (These would only be worth something if the
bank’s stock went up.) Excessive compensation and golden parachutes
would be banned but this amounts to a restatement of the joke standards
which occur in the original bailout bill. The FDIC also announced that
it would extend protection to roughly the one-third of small business
accounts that its new $250,000 limit did not currently cover.
On October 15, 2008, the Dow nosedived again dropping 733.08 points
(7.87%) to close at 8,577.91. This volatility is an important indicator
that the problems underlying the meltdown remain unaddressed and that
the reality that the world economy is in recession is slowly sinking in.
An October 18, 2008 article
in the Guardian reports that the 6 firms to receive a $125 billion
injection of capital from the US government are slated to pay their
employees $70 billion in compensation this year most of it in the form
of bonuses. Obscene? Divorced from reality? Of course, that $70 billion
is nearly half the size of the$160 billion stimulus package earlier
this year for the entire country. But what did you expect? These are
Henry Paulson’s people. He is one of them. The rest of the country may
be headed toward Depression but those who sent it there must be kept in
their Porsches and mistresses.
The industry argument is that bonuses are necessary to keep top
talent at a company. There are two replies to this. First, this top
talent is made up of those most responsible for the current meltdown.
Are these the people they really want to keep, let alone reward?
Second, seriously where are they going to go? The financial sector has
been hemorrhaging jobs. The truth is that there are many others, at
least as qualified, who would love to take their places.
An October 20, 2008 Wall Street Journal article
reported that under pressure from Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and
Mel Martinez (R-FL) insurance giant AIG recipient of a $122 billion
bailout has agreed to cancel 160 events which would have cost $80
million. More importantly it has agreed to suspend its lobbying efforts
which incredibly included a push to get states to loosen requirements
on regulating mortgage lenders.
On October 21, 2008, the Fed
announced yet another program the Money Market Investor Funding
Facility (MMIFF). Its object was to help money markets in their
redemptions (cash demands from their customers) by buying up to $600
billion of their short term (90 day or less) paper with the further
goal of loosening up credit at more of a commercial and consumer level.
In keeping with the lack of transparency and corporate cronyism that is
typical of all these efforts, JP Morgan was chosen by a group of
undisclosed money markets to administer the program and buy their
securities and those of an also undisclosed list of other money
markets. Nice bit of back scratching that.
On November 4, 2008,
the Libor (short term interbank loan rates) fell to pre-Lehman levels.
The 3 month rate fell to 2.71% and the overnight rate went to a
historic low of .38%. This was a major goal of the trillions that
Bernanke threw into the financial system. The theory was that getting
the Libor lower would free up credit. This really didn’t happen however
because the underlying solvency questions remained unresolved and
unaddressed. The continuing credit crunch is seen in the spread between
the Libor and Fed rates which remains elevated at 2.11%. Prior to
September 15, the spread was 0.11%.
On November 6, 2008,
the Bank of England cut its benchmark rate 1.5% to 3% and the European
Central Bank cut its rate 0.5% to 3.25%. These are futher indications
that the world economy is slipping into recession and that lenders
continue not to lend.
On November 10, 2008, the Treasury
Department announced that as part of a new comprehensive deal with AIG
it would pour another $40 billion into the bottomless pit and sometime
insurance company. It is getting really tricky even to know how much
the government has spent on AIG. The government rather disingenuously
argued that by investing $40 billion in AIG it was actually reducing
its exposure from $152 billion to $112 billion. However most of the
government’s $122.8 billion credit line to AIG or around $112 billion
has already been spent. However most of the government’s $122.8 billion
credit line to AIG (the $112 billion) has already been spent. Taking
into account the $40 billion the government is now committing, it is
likely that the $152 billion number is what has been sunk into the
company to date.
There is, of course, more to the story. There always is. The
government which now virtually owns AIG is setting up two shell
companies to offload debt from AIG’s bottomline. The government as AIG
will put up $5 billion and the government as itself will put up another
$30 billion to set up a company to buy back $70 billion in credit
default swaps (CDSs) for 50 cents on the dollar. Losses from this
company will not show up on AIG’s balance sheet. Similarly, the
government in its role as AIG will lay out $1 billion and as itself
$22.5 billion to buy back collateralized debt obligations (CDOs which
AIG had insured through its CDSs). So while the government is saying
that it is reducing its interest in AIG it has actually increased its
involvement from around $112 billion to $210.5 billion (the $40 billion
plus the $35 billion and $23.5 billion entities). To add insult to
injury, Treasury announced that it was freezing AIG’s bonus pool, not
reducing or eliminating it, but just keeping it at current levels. The
economy is in recession. It is hemorrhaging jobs. The deficit is
exploding, and this is Henry Paulson’s idea of how to treat those most
responsible for the debacle: that their bonuses only will not be
increased. It would be laughable if it did not make you want to weep.
And one further point. Paulson is taking the $40 billion out of the
$700 billion bailout (the TARP). No indication where the $52.5 billion
for the two debt buying entities will come from. Taken together with
the $250 billion bank bailout, this means that Treasury has already
committed $290 billion of the intial $350 billion portion of the
bailout and so far not one dime of it has been spent on its ostensible
purpose of buying toxic assets. Given the speed with which Paulson is
blowing through bailout funds, he is on track to spend most or all of
them before President Obama takes office and to very little effect
other than helping out his cronies.
A November 10, 2008
Bloomberg article reported that since the failure of Lehman on
September 15, the Fed has dwarfed the Paulson bailout making $1.172
trillion in loans to banks and bringing its overall lending to more
than $2 trillion.
A November 10, 2008
piece in the Washington Post reported that Paulson’s Treasury
Department issued a 5 sentence revision on September 30, 2008 to a 1986
law governing Section 382 of the tax code. Known as the Wells Fargo
Ruling, this change allowed banks to merge with other banks and use the
losses of one to count against the profits of the other for tax
purposes. Two days later on October 2, Wells Fargo used it to finance
its takeover of Wachovia. It is estimated that the ruling was worth $25
billion to Wells Fargo in the deal. It has been used since in a rash of
bank mergers and could result in a $140 billion windfall for banks over
and above the $250 billion they are getting so far from the bailout.
And oh yes, it isn’t legal. Neither Paulson nor Treasury had the power
to change the law. It isn’t clear what a lameduck Congress will do
about it though. This is just further evidence, if any were needed,
that Paulson is a loose cannon who either is a bumbling idiot who
doesn’t know what he is doing, or someone who will loot the government
and break the law as long as he is allowed to do so to enrich his
friends and cronies on Wall Street, or both.
The arrogant lawlessness of the current Administration, the greed of
Wall Street, and the abject cowardice of the Congress guarantee that
nothing will be done before the next Administration comes to office,
and maybe not even then. The Great American Steal looks like it is
going to be with us for a while.
On November 11, 2008,
the Bush Administration announced another cosmetic plan to help
homeowners. This one would work through Fannie and Freddie, be
available to only a few hundred thousand homeowners not bankrupt,
delinquent at least 90 days, and still owe at least 90%. Terms would be
a rollback in interest for 5 years for a payment of 38% of monthly
income or less, then an increase in rates with a mortgage extension of
up to 40 years. The principle on the loan would not be reduced. This
seems more like a plan to defer and spread out foreclosures for the
benefit of Fannie and Freddie rather than avoiding foreclosures to help
homeowners.
On November 12, 2008,
in his never ending quest to show that he remains solidly behind the
curve, Treasury Secretary Paulson announced that no bailout monies
would be used to buy up toxic assets.
During the two weeks that Congress considered the
legislation, market conditions worsened considerably. It was clear to
me by the time the bill was signed on October 3rd that we needed to act
quickly and forcefully, and that purchasing troubled assets – our
initial focus – would take time to implement and would not be
sufficient given the severity of the problem.
And later
Over these past weeks we have continued to examine the
relative benefits of purchasing illiquid mortgage-related assets. Our
assessment at this time is that this is not the most effective way to
use TARP funds
What you need to keep in mind is that buying up toxic assets was the
raison d’être of the Paulson plan, the TARP (the Troubled Asset Relief
Program) referred to above. It was what, he asserted, was needed to
keep the financial system from collapsing. Even at the time he was
warned by many that it was a supremely bad idea, and after kicking it
around for nearly two months, he now agrees but makes it sound like he
had questions about it from the beginning. He didn’t. This typifies the
Paulson style: absolute confidence coupled with a refusal to address or
even acknowledge core problems. He dithers, gets it wrong, and even
when he stumbles or is pushed in the right direction he embraces a
solution that is totally inadequate. In other words, Paulson is very
much part of the problem, not part of the solution.
On November 14, 2008
, head of the FDIC Sheila Bair announced a mortgage assistance plan for
distressed homeowners. It would involve modification of loans through a
mix of loan extension, interest rate reduction, and forbearance on the
principal. Bair estimates that half of some 4.4 million mortgage loans
mortgages currently in default or expected to be in default by the end
of 2009 and not held by Fannie and Freddie could be modified. Even if a
third of these re-default, 1.5 million homeowners would be helped at a
projected cost of $24.4 billion. Monthly payments would not exceed 31%
of monthly income. For the first 8 years, the FDIC would assume half
the loss of a redefault in conjunction with loan servicers. The major
obstacle to the plan is that the $24.4 billion would come from the
Paulson bailout and neither Paulson nor his younger clone Kashkari want
to use even a thin red dime of it to help ordinary Americans.
On November 18-19, 2008,
executives of the Big 3 auto companies came to Washington to testify
before Congress and ask for $25 billion in loans. Republicans blocked
any deal and Senate Majority leader Harry Reid (D-NV) told them to come
back on December 4-5 with a detailed plan. Now there are several things
that need to be said here. The American auto industry has been poorly
managed for decades. They resisted successfully making their products
cleaner and more fuel efficient and instead promoted the sale of trucks
and SUVs on which they could make bigger profits. That said, the fault
for the current downturn in the industry has less to do with Detroit
than with Wall Street with regard to the credit crunch, the recession,
and even the initial spike in oil prices (this item and 365). Unlike
financial institutions, the auto industry is part of the real economy
and represents millions of jobs which would be put in jeopardy if the
Big 3 were allowed to go bankrupt. The loss of even a portion of these
would send the economy into a deeper and longer recession. The amounts
of money involved are actually rather small compared to the trillions
that Paulson and Bernanke have been throwing (with little result) at
banks and financial companies. There is also the mismatch between the
no plans, no strings attached approach taken toward the financial
community and the “detailed” plan demanded of automakers. And there is
a continued absence of a concerted plan from the Congress on what it
wants to see done by anyone.
Additionally, Republicans, especially Southern Republicans, would
like to use the current crisis for ideological reasons to attack unions
and effectively destroy the UAW and for purely selfish, extremely
shortsighted, and even “unpatriotic” motives to use a bankruptcy of
American automakers to favor foreign non-union auto plants in their
states. What they don’t seem to understand is that if the economy tanks
no one will be buying cars and autoworkers won’t be working whether
they are living in Michigan or Alabama or in a union or a non-union
shop.
Finally, no bailout of the auto industry or the financial community
will work unless it is part of an overall coordinated plan to restart
the economy.
On November 23, 2008,
the Fed with participation by the Treasury and FDIC announced a rescue
plan for what has been the nation’s largest banking concern Citigroup.
The company has seen a drop in its share price in the last year from a
high of $57.40 to a low of $2.91. Part of this reflects bad decisions
it made. However, a lot of its recent fall was the work of short
sellers which the SEC has done almost nothing to curb, despite the
instability they produce. The Citigroup bailout consists of a
government backed guarantee on $306 billion of the bank’s assets. The
company will be responsible for the first $29 billion in losses. After
that there will be a 90-10 split on losses between the government and
Citigroup with the government responsible for the 90% share. Treasury
will take the first $5 billion of these through the TARP. The FDIC is
then in for the next $10 billion and the Fed is in for the rest to the
$306 billion limit. In exchange for this guarantee, Citigroup will give
the government $7 billion in stock with an 8% dividend ($4 billion to
Treasury; $3 billion to the FDIC). It agrees to pay no more than 4
cents a year per share in dividends on its other stock and to submit a
plan to limit executive compensation. In addition, Treasury will make a
direct $20 billion investment in Citigroup. All the stock the
government gets in the deal will be non-voting, or in other words more
of the same: Citigroup gets the money and gets to keep its top
management, and the taxpayer gets neither ownership nor control but
does assume the risk.
A November 24, 2008
story in Bloomberg reports that the government has already made $7.76
trillion in commitments to the financial community as a result of the
financial meltdown. The Fed whose role in this crisis has largely gone
unreviewed has made $4.74 trillion or 61% of the pledges on behalf of
the government. Financial institutions have already made use of $3.18
trillion or 41% of them. Meanwhile the government and Congress are
going through contortions over a $25 billion bailout for the auto
industry and the more than a million jobs it represents.
On November 25, 2008, the government upped its commitments to
financial markets to $8.56 trillion. Paulson and Bernanke’s efforts to
free up credit markets continue to founder due to the unstated
insolvency of much of the banking sector. As a result in a further
attempt to loosen consumer credit without addressing the fundamental
issue of insolvency, the Fed announced yet another loan facility
worth $200 billion with a $20 billion guarantee from the Treasury. The
Fed would basically exchange money for the banks’ consumer credit
paper. In an even bigger move,
the Fed will buy up $600 billion of debt from Fannie and Freddie, $100
billion directly and $500 billion funneled through its asset managers.
On November 28, 2008,
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the official caller of
these things, announced that the US economy had been in recession since
December 2007. Because the NBER analysis is retrospective, its
announcement comes many months after the event. But it was obvious
following the blowup of the housing bubble on August 9, 2007, the
economy was in trouble. The $160 billion stimulus had only mild
transient effects in the second quarter of 2008. That was about it. The
country was distracted by the Presidential race, but the Bush
Administration, Treasury’s Paulson, and the Fed’s Bernanke, for whom
this wasn’t a concern, spent their time doing as little as possible to
address the slowing economy.
On December 3, 2008,
the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced new rules for Wall
Street’s three ratings agencies: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and
Fitch. The ratings agencies used old models to rate the new and much
riskier financial instruments that led to the housing bubble and later
the financial meltdown. They also had an inherent conflict of interest
with those seeking their ratings because they were funded by them and
made large profits by working with them. The new rules require greater
transparency and verification in the ratings process, but, typical of
the Bush Administration, leave the biggest conflict of interest, the
funding mechanism, in place.
On December 9, 2008,
the interest rate on T-bills hit zero on a Fed sale of $30 billion on 4
week notes. On the same day, the rate on 3 month notes actually turned
negative. This is indicative of both a flight to safety but also
deflation.
On December 10, 2008,
the GAO issued a report on the Treasury bailout. It found that the TARP
run by Neel Kashkari did not know, and had not put in place the means
to know, how banks were spending the $155 billion so far injected into
them under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). As a result, the TARP
had no way to tell if the banks were honoring their agreements with the
government or if all those billions were having their intended effect.
Instead Kashkari favored developing general metrics rather than
specific monitoring by regulators to see if banks were doing what they
were supposed to be. Likewise, he had no way to know if limits on
executive pay, dividends, and stock repurchases were being respected.
Additionally, Kashkari has done nothing to smooth a transition to
the next Administration. His office remains understaffed. As of
November 21, it had 5 permanent hires and 48 employees assigned from
other Treasury sections out of a projected need of 200. There was a
lack of oversight of contractors hired by Kaskari’s office and a lack
of internal controls to assure that the money Kashkari was spending was
well spent. Nor were regulations governing conflict of interest in
place. These are especially important because of the dominant role that
former Goldman Sachs employees and contractors have had in the program.
Of course, if this was done, this most crony capitalist of programs
would have to fold up shop.
On December 4, 2008, the GAO issued a similar report on tracking banks’ aid to distressed homeowners.
Also on December 10, 2008,
the Congressional Oversight Panel created by the bill that set up the
TARP as an afterthought came out with a report that echoed many of the
points made in the GAO report, underlined the perilous state of the US
economy.
And in a December10, 2008
story in Bloomberg, it was reported that Ben Bernanke in a response to
a letter from Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) announced that the Fed
would not participate in any efforts to save American automakers. Now
on the one hand, the Fed’s primary mission is to oversee the financial
system but on the other given its massive and unprecedented intrusion
into the economy and the failure of both the Fed and Treasury to
foresee the devastating effects of the Lehman collapse, it seems a
curious place to draw a line. But it is consistent with Paulson and
Bernanke’s actions to shore up the paper “bubble” economy at literally
any cost and their indifference and even hostility to the real economy
and the plight of ordinary Americans.
On December 11, 2008,
the Senate failed to invoke cloture 52-35 (60 votes needed) on a bill
to bailout the auto industry effectively killing it. This made it more
likely that the automakers and their supplies would be forced into
bankruptcy. 3 million Americans could become unemployed at a time when
the economy is already hemorrhaging jobs. The effort to destroy the
industry, the union, and all those jobs was led by ideologically driven
Southern Republicans, like Bob Corker (R-TN), Richard Shelby (D-AL),
Jim DeMint (R-SC), and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY).
A few Republicans favored cloture: Bond (R-MO), Brownback (R-KS),
Collins (R-ME), Dole (R-NC), Lugar (R-IN), Snowe (R-ME), Specter
(R-PA), Voinovich (R-OH), and Warner (R-VA) but as it was clear the
cloture vote would fail their votes were cosmetic and largely meant to
placate constituents. Only Dole and Warner’s votes meant anything since
both are leaving the Senate. Less explicable were the votes of
Democrats who voted against cloture: Baucus (D-MT), Lincoln (D-AR), and
Tester (D-MT). Reid (D-NV) also voted against but his was a standard
parliamentary maneuver to allow for a later reconsideration. 12
Senators did not vote: Alexander (R-TN), Biden (D-DE), Cornyn (R-TX),
Craig (R-ID), Graham (R-SC), Hagel (R-NE), Kennedy (D-MA), Kerry
(D-MA), Smith (R-OR), Stevens (R-AK), Sununu (R-NH), and Wyden (D-OR).
The reasons for the non-votes were various. I include this information
because this was a vote of a critically important and criminally
irresponsible nature. It was a vote to send the country into depression.
Also on December 11, 2008,
Bernard Madoff, a former chairman of the NASDAQ was arrested for
perpetrating a fraud which lost up to $50 billion in investors’ money.
It has been called the largest Ponzi scheme committed by a single
individual in US history. This appellation is perhaps intentionally
misleading because it distracts from the fact that the whole financial
system has been run collectively as an over-sized Ponzi operation.
Madoff began his investment firm in 1960. He had consistent profits
regardless of market conditions which no one else could reproduce. In
1992, a fund associated with Madoff was investigated but he seems to
have escaped any real scrutiny. It appears he operated his scheme for
decades. By 2000, his company had several hundred million in assets and
it seems to have ballooned into the billions in the Bush years. He was
able to get away with his fraud for so long because he held his
accounts within his own firm instead of with an outside bank. He had
status as a Chairman of NASDAQ. He had successfully dodged one
investigation. And with SEC Chairmen like William Donaldson (2003-2005)
and Christopher Cox (2005-present) who were rabidly anti-regulationist,
he was essentially home free. It took the financial meltdown to do him
in. His victims include many retirees, charities, foreign banks as well
as many celebrities and wealthy. Some of these certainly knew that what
Madoff was doing was too good to be true but as long as he was making
money for them they were willing not to ask to many questions. As part
of an eventual settlement those who made profits with Madoff will have
to return some or all of them to make good in so far as that is
possible those who lost their shirts. It is still an open question
where the money went, how much was actually lost, and who all was
involved in Madoff’s crimes. In any case, Madoff is a metaphor for the
current financial system and its failures.
On December 16, 2008,
the Fed announced it was lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at
which banks lend to each other, usually overnight) to zero to .25
percent. It said it would continue to buy large amounts of agency debt
(Fannie, Freddie, and Sally (student loans)) and mortgage backed
securities (crap assets). Finally, it said it was considering buying
longer Treasuries. Since it has taken short term rates to essentially
zero, buying longer term T-bills would be a way of affecting and
lowering longer term interest rates. To date Bernanke has pumped
trillions into a liquidity trap, i.e. the money goes to the banks but
doesn’t get lent back out, and has now lost an important tool in
regulating monetary supply. Rather than change a failed policy which
has done nothing to free up credit, he is continuing to double down,
now contemplating a move into longer term interest rates.
On December 17, 2008,
with the Bush Administration continuing to dither over extending a $14
billion bridge loan to the American auto industry, Chrysler announced
it would close all of its 30 plants for one month beginning December
19, 2008. At the same time, Ford said it would increase its holiday
shutdown to three weeks. There really is no other way to put it, as the
economy skates on the edge of depression, the Republicans play games.
On December 19, 2008,
as part in another of a long series of Friday news dumps, the White
House finally announced a temporary bailout for the auto industry.
$13.4 billion will be made available in short term loans from TARP
funds with an additional $4 billion in February. In exchange the
government would get warrants for non-voting stock. This is a deal that
could have been worked out a month ago but wasn’t due to the
ideological opposition of the Administration to doing anything that
would help out the real economy and the ongoing desire of Republicans
in both the Congress and the White House to destroy unions in general
and the UAW in particular. The agreement contains the standard lines
about limits on executive compensation and prohibits dividends during
the course of their loans. The automakers are to show by March 31, 2009
that they are financially viable, a requirement which was never made of
financial institutions which received the vast majority of TARP money.
This is kabuki. The automakers will come up with re-structuring plans
and, regardless of their feasibility, the Obama Administration will
approve them (because the alternative is depression).
The package also has a set of noxious “targets” which represent a
grab bag of conservative demands but being targets they don’t actually
have to be met. Rather they are meant to supply conservative critics of
the auto bailout future talking points:
- An exchange of equity for debt to reduce their debt by 2/3. This would essentially sell the companies to bondholders.
- Wages and work rules similar to those for foreign automakers by
December 31, 2009. When legacy costs are factored in, these would
likely make autoworkers for the Big 3 earn less than their non-union
counterparts working for foreign brands.
- It would allow the companies to make half their payments into retirement funds in the form of fairly worthless stock
- And finally it would eliminate the jobs bank, something the union has already agreed to.
In addition, Secretary Paulson has asked that Congress free up the
remaining $350 billion in TARP funds. Given how poorly Paulson has
spent the first half $350 billion, it would be very unwise to let him
anywhere near any further funds.
Also on December 19, 2008,
the Fed announce that it would allow access to its $200 billion Term
Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) to all investors,
including hedge funds, who hold consumer debt instruments. This means
that they can dump these instruments on the Fed in exchange for cash.
The theory, but unfortunately not the practice, is that these investors
will use the money they get to invest in more consumer credit. There is
no indication that they will. The inclusion of hedge funds is an
especially worrisome sign because there are increasing questions
concerning the solvency of these private opaque actors.
On December 29, 2008, Treasury
announced it would lend $5 billion for non-voting stock with an 8%
annual dividend to the finance company GMAC which is co-owned by GM and
the Cerberus hedge fund (which also owns Chrysler). GMAC is in the
process of converting itself into a bank holding company. In order for
it to do this, bondholders must agree to swap 75% of GMAC’s $38 billion
debt for stock. Treasury would also lend up to $1 billion to GM to buy
a further stake in GMAC. Cerberus looks to be functionally insolvent
and so can not sink any money into the deal but it is unclear, except
for the crony capitalist way these deals get structured, why it
shouldn’t lose its stakes in Chrysler and GMAC.
A December 31, 2008
story in TPMMuckraker notes another instance of crony capitalism
perpetrated by those who are supposed to be seeing us out of this mess.
Private managers of a Fed program announced November 25, 2008 (see
above) to buy up $500 billion in mortgage backed securities from Fannie
and Freddie (who themselves have been directed by Treasury’s Paulson to
buy up some $400 billion in these toxic assets; see October 11, 2008
paragraph above) are Goldman Sachs (please try to restrain your
surprise), Blackrock, Wellington Management, and PIMCO. PIMCO holds
some $500 billion in these securities (61% of its assets) and lobbied
for the creation of this program. Under a selection process that was
not made public, it now comes out that it is one of those overseeing
the buy back (a function it also lobbied for) of exactly the kind of
securities it holds. All of this is one big conflict of interest and
shows once again that the financial bailout is being run by and for
precisely those who created the need for it.
On January 12, 2009,
George Bush at President-elect Barack Obama’s request notified Congress
to release the remaining $350 billion of the Paulson bailout. Doing it
this way will allow Obama to use the money with the same lack of
controls as under Bush.
On January 16, 2009,
Treasury announced a further bailout of Bank of America. Bank of
America expressed “surprise” that the investment bank Merrill Lynch
which it took over in September lost $15.3 billion in the last quarter
of 2008. In a deal structured similarly to the recent one with
Citigroup, BoA will receive another $20 billion in TARP funds (in
exchange for $4 billion in BoA stock) and it will receive a “backstop”
for some $98.2 billion of its crap assets. BoA will cover the first $10
billion, the FDIC picks up the next $10 billion and the Fed and BoA
split any other losses on the remaining $78.2 billion, 90% by the Fed,
10% by BoA. So just to recap, BoA is at most out $4 billion in stock
plus $10 billion in initial losses plus 10% of $78.2 billion in
subsequent losses or $21.8 billion. But it just received $20 billion
from Paulson so for a net pay out of $1.8 billion, it has gotten a
government guarantee on $98.2 billion of its crap assets.
This is just obscene. What is happening here is about
recapitalization of the banking industry by the backdoor without the
government or the taxpayer getting anything but debt in return. It is
yet another case among so many of “Privatizing gains and socializing
losses”. BoA is under no obligation after this either to help
distressed homeowners or resume normal lending to ease the credit
crunch. It is also an example of how taxpayers are paying for the
consolidation now occurring in the financial industry. BoA takes over
Merrill, keeps the good stuff, and dumps the crap on the government,
and ultimately the American taxpayer. And it shows once again how the
paper economy is favored over the real one. The BoA bailout is not just
a sweetheart deal. It is a giveaway. It was agreed late at night with
no one watching or asking questions and none of the very public and
long drawn out groveling that was required of the auto industry and its
executives for a deal that was much smaller and had much harder
conditions.
As long as Paulson and his successors in the incoming Obama
Administration continue to favor BoA and other institutions like it
over the wider economy and the interests of ordinary Americans and as
long as they refuse to address the fundamental problems underlying the
meltdown, we are not going to get out of the current crisis but we will
pay for it anyway. Their priorities and approach remain completely out
of whack. BoA comes out of this stronger, but the economy and the
country have been made weaker.
And if even after all this BoA still has problems, it can follow the model of Citigroup one step further. Citi
is currently in the process of splitting itself in two. In one part
will be its profitable operations and in the other will be its
remaining crap and unprofitable divisions. One will go on conducting
business as usual and the other will be allowed to fail, be bailed out
again and again by the government, or be sold if anyone can be found
crazy enough to buy it. There is no way that the government should let
Citi do this, but there is not a chance that it won’t. But that is the
thing, the people who perpetrated the meltdown on us are also the
people who are running the response to it, and neither those in
government or in the industry have changed how they do business, the
business that got us in this mess, at all.